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This paper presents the author's research into the constitutional 
practices of closely held companies under the Companies Act 1993. 
The objective of the study is to analyse the appropriateness of 
constitutions being registered by closely held companies. 
By way of background, the applicability of the Act to closely held 
companies, and in particular section 107 agreements, which were 
provided to reduce the statutory burden on such companies are 
examined . 
It is argued that while at first instance section 107 appears to 
reduce the burden of formalities on closely held companies, there 
are certain features which reduce its effectiveness, such as its 
limited scope, the termination right, and the uncertain effect on 
the common lak doctrine of unanimous shareholder assent. 
The body of the paper is devoted to presenting the findings of the 
author's research into the constitutional practices of closely held 
companies. 
It is argued that the findings reveal that the constitution is 
being used only with limited success to meet the needs of these 
companies. A proliferation of standard form constitutions means 
that the statutory regime is not being altered to properll protect 
the interests of the members of closely held 
companies, or to reduce unnecessary statutory formalities for them. 
Similarly, it is argued that the drafting style of many of the 
constitutions is inappropriate for closely held companies, being 
overly long and confusing. 
It is concluded that a move towards more concise and tailor-made 
constitutions is needed by closely held companies and their 
advisers, in order to protect their interests and reduce the 
formalities of operation under the Act . 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 13500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The place of the closely held company in the traditional company 
law framework has received increasing academic and legislative 
attentiqn over the last century. As their title suggests, closely 
held companies are characterised by their small and intimate size. 
For much of its history, both in terms of the common law and 
legislation, company law has been founded on the large public 
company model. The result is that closely held companies sit 
uneasily within this framework. Many of the rules and formalities 
imposed upon them are inapplicable to their situation. 
In New Zealand, 1 ike the rest of the world, for many small 
businesses the advantages of incorporation are seen to outweigh the 
disadvantages of the cumbersome regulatory rules. As a result, the 
majority of New Zealand's registered companies are closely held 
ones, which in essence are just incorporated partnerships and sole 
proprietorships. 1 
In the company law reforms of 1993 the New Zealand Law Commission 
declined to make separate statutory provision for closely held 
companies, as has been the case in many overseas jurisdictions. 
Instead it proposed an Act still framed in terms of traditional 
company law rules, based upon the widely held public company model, 
but with what it considered to be an element of flexibility for 
Estimated to be around 90%, see R Dugan The Companies 
Act 1993: Governance Issues for Closely Held Companies 
(Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 
Wellington, 1997) 1. It should be noted that many small 
companies are not closely held in the true sense. 
Subsidiary and joint venture companies would also be 
reflected in this figure. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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closely held companies. 2 The mechanisms for achieving this 
flexibility included the constitution, which can be used to vary 
many of the rules under the Act, and section 107 agreements, which 
allow many of the formality requirements of the Act to be avoided. 
With regard to the constitution, the Commission considered that if 
there was a demand for standard constitutions for closely held 
companies, they would be readily available. However, it also 
thought that the diversity of many closely held companies would 
necessitate many tailor-made constitutions.
3 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the position of the 
closely held company under the Companies Act 1993 ("the new Act"), 
and in particular to follow up the Law Commission's statements in 
regard to constitutions for closely held companies. 
The three year transitional period between Companies Acts is now 
over. All companies in New Zealand are now governed by the new Act. 
The concept of the company constitution is a novel one for close ly 
held companies and their advisers, and it raises many questions. 
Are closely held companies using constitutions? Are standard form 
constitutions readily available as the Law Commission predicted? 
If so, what are the contents of these constitutions, and are they 
appropriate for closely held companies ? Are tailor-made 
constitutions that meet the needs of particular companies also 
being used ? What drafting styles are being adopted and what are 
the consequences of these ? This paper attempts to 
preliminary answers to these questions. 
ew Zealand Law Commission Company Law Reform: 
Transition and Revision - Report No 16 (Wellington, 
1990.) 56. 
Above n 2, 57. 
find some 
11 
By way of background Part II of the paper outlines the concept of 
the closely held company and its main characteristics , while Part 
III examines its treatment in other jurisdictions. Part IV examines 
the new Act and its application to closely held companies . In 
particular , section 107 agreements are critiqued as a device for 
providing for closely held companies . The concept of the 
constitution and its anticipated role are then outlined . Parts V 
and VI outline the study and its results. The results are then 
analysed in Parts VII and VIII , with concluding remarks in Part IX . 
I I THE CLOSELY HELD COMPANY 
Closely held companies have been described by various titles, 
including incorporated partnerships , closed companies and private 
companies. These all allude to different characteristics, and 
indicate that it is hard to give them a precise definition .
4 
However, the general characteristics of the closely held company 
can be described as follows .
5 
First, as the shareholders are few in number they will usually take 
an active part in the management of the co mpany . There is a lack of 
the separation of ownership and control that characterises more 
widely held companies , and which is the basis of much traditional 
company regulation . This means that statutory rules which seek to 
hold manage ment accountable to shareholders are not applicable, and 
F O' Neal and R Thompson O 'Neals Close Corporations ( 3ed, 
Clark Boardman & Callaghan , New York, 1996) 15 . 
See generally above n 1 and 4; WH Painter Painter on 
Close Corporations (Little Brown & Co , Boston , 1991) . 
12 
therefore unnecessary . Such rules typically take the form of 
requirements such as meetings, disclosure and certification. For a 
closely held compan these formalities impose unnecessary 
compliance costs. Further, the liability that often accompanies 
infringement of these rules is particularly unwarranted.
6 
Secondly, personal identities are important in companies of such a 
size. The members will usually wish to depart from the traditional 
company law framework in which shares are freely transferable. 
Instead they will be anxious to have a degree of control over the 
transfer of shares in the company, to ensure that they are in the 
hands of people that they are happy working with.
7 
As investing in a closely held company often represents the 
livelihoods of the members, they will also want to protect their 
int e rests by departing from the traditional company law management 
regime of majority rules . All the members will usually wish to have 
a say in the running of the business. The decision making in such 
companies therefore often follows a partnership style, requiring 
the agreement of all the members.
8 
Further to this, the members will also wish to protect their 
interests in the company by ensuring that they have security in 
their positions as officers or employees.
9 
However, the expectations of members of closely held companies can 
differ in respect to management, as well as holdings and returns. 
Some may wish to have a passive role , leaving the running of the 
Above n 1, 3. 
Above n -1, 16. 
8 Above n 4' 16. 
9 Above 11 .i' 16. 
13 
business to the other members. As a result many closely held 
co mpanies have unique capital structures, with differing rights 
attaching to shares, to cater for these varying interests .
10 
Overall, while preferring their internal affairs and relationships 
to be conducted more like a partnership than a company , the members 
seek the benefits of incorporatiou . Incorporation offers the 
benefit of limited liability . While limited liability is something 
of a fiction in such small companies, where creditors invariabl1 
contract around it by way of personal guarantees and security , it 
is still beneficial as against small creditors and legal action . :
1 
Incorporation also has othei benefits , like the peculiarity of the 
common law that only a company can grant a floating charge, 
something that a small business starting up will invariably have to 
do . 12 
Now that small companies can gain the beneficial treatment of the 
qualifying company regime , there is less distinction between the 
Laxation treatment of companies and partnerships .
13 
These factors all combine to make the company structure a popular 
choice for many small businesses . However , the traditional company 
law framework, which pro ides for features such as Lhe free 
transferability of shares and decisions by majority, 
inappropriate , and will need alteration if possible . 
10 
11 
12 
13 
R Dugan Company Law: A Transactional Approach 
(Butterworths , Wellington , 1994) 66 . 
New Zealand Law Commission CompanJ Law: A Discussion 
Paper - Preliminary Paper No 5 (Wellington, 1987) 11. 
Above n 10 , 36. 
The Income Tax Act 1994, subpart HG . 
is 
14 
A One Person Companies 
A significant proportion of closely held companies are one person 
ones. Traditionally, the contractual nature of a company has alwa s 
meant that at least two members are required. Howe"\er , 
incorporation has always been attractive to sole proprietors, for 
the benefit of combining sole control with limi ted liability.
11 
To 
get around the requirement of having al least two shareholders , a 
notional second shareholder wilh a minimal holding was normall 
used. 
E"\en in these circumstances the courts have recognised the separate 
legal existence of the company , and the ", eil of incorporation" 
~hich protects the member. 15 This has made the one person company 
a popular business entit . Some academic commentators have 
suggested that the veil should be disregarded in these 
circumstances as a sham. 16 However, in New Zealand there is 
express recognition in the new Act of one person companies.
17 
now 
The one person company avoids many of the problems associated with 
a multi- rson company as described abo"\ e. As one person has 
fundamental control over the business and decisions therein, there 
are no problems over the allocation of control and the protection 
of interests, security in office and e mployment, and restrictions 
i4 
15 
16 
17 
Above n 4, 16; W Fuller "The Incorporated Individual: A 
Study of the One Man Company" [1938] HLR 1373. 
Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd [1961] NZLR 325. 
BF Cataldo "Limited Liability I ith One Person Companies 
and Subsidiaries" [1953] Law and Contemporary Problems 
473 . 
Section lO(c). 
.. 
.. 
15 
on the transfer of shares .
18 Therefore the company can usually 
operate satisfactorily under the traditional company law framework. 
But like a multi-person company , as there is a common identit) 
between the ownership and management of a one person compan , 
traditional company law formalities predicated on the separation of 
these two facets are unnecessary , and impose unwarranted costs on 
such a company. 13 
III OVERSEAS TREATMENT OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 
As outlined , the nature of closely held companies means that thel 
sit Lmeasily within traditional company law statutes, v.hich are 
based on the widely held company model. Judicial and legislative 
recognition of the closely held compan y and its particular needs 
have been steadily gaining momentum over the last century. The 
following discussion provides an overview of the Lreatment of 
c l osely held companies overseas . 
A The English Private Company 
England was one of the first jurisdictions to give legislati e 
recognition to the particular needs of closely held companies, with 
its private company distinction .
20 The private co mpany is defined 
as one in which the shares are held b 
18 
19 
20 
Above n 4 , 16 . 
Above n 1, 12 . 
The Companies Act 1907 (UK) . 
a restricted group of 
16 
persons , and can not be freel1 acquired by members of the public .
21 
Certain benefits are conferred upon pri ate companies , in 
recognition of the their excessive operational costs , These include 
less formalities in their incorporation , and exemption from certain 
reporting requirements . 22 
ln its tradition of copying English company law statutes, New 
Zealand also adopted the private company distinction under the 
Companies Act 1955 ( "the old Act'' ), Like its English counterpart, 
the New Zealand private company was also defined in terms of 
limited numbers of members , and restrictions on share transfers, 
Similarly, preferential treatment was received by private companies 
in terms of reporting requirements and disclosure, and also the 
ability to pass resolutions in lieu of meetings.
23 
The distinctive features of the private compan have also received 
judicial recogni t.i.on, In Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 
24 
the 
House of Lords recognised the quasi-partnership nature of private 
companies . Ebrahimi involved a typical closely held company 
situation , with three members who had an equal say in Lhe running 
of the business, and shared equall~ in the profits . In the face of 
a dispute , a classical "freeze-out" scenario ensued, whereby two of 
the members combined to gang up on the third, remo~ing him from his 
office as director, excluding him from participation in the 
management of the business , and discontinuing his share of the 
profits. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
LCB Gower et al Gower's Principles of .'tfodern Company Law 
(8ed, Sweet and Maxwell , London , 1992) 108 . 
Above n 21, 109 . 
See generally A Beck and A Borrowdale Guidebook to New 
Zealand Companies and Securities Law (5ed, CCH New 
Zealand Ltd, Auckland, 1994) 10. 
[1972] 2 All ER 492; [1973] AC 360 . 
17 
The House held that the majority had acted inequitably , and that in 
light of the partnership nature of the business and the subsequent 
collapse of trust and confidence therein , it was just and equitable 
Lo liquidate the company to release the minority member. 25 
B The United States 
While the United States was slower to recognise the nature of 
closely held companies, in the last fifty years it has led the wa 
in catering for their needs and expanding their possibilities. 
First , the courts have recognised the vulnerability of minority 
shareholders in closely held companies to "freeze-out" tactics like 
thos-e in Ebrahimi. Their response has been to impose fiduciary 
duties of good faith and loyalty on the shareholders of closely 
held companies. 26 
Secondly, the United States has been the primary mover in terms of 
legislation designed to cater for closely held companies. 
states have created provisions in their general company 
statutes to provide flexibilities and exemptions for closely 
companies . 
25 
26 
27 
27 Others have created special separate statutes 
Abo\e n 23, 340 . 
Donahue v Rodd Electrotype Co 328 NE 2d 505 ( 1975); 
Crosby v Beam 548 NE 2d 217 (1989); see generally WL 
Cary et al Cases and Materials on Corporations ( 6ed, 
Foundation Press , New York, 1988) 240; A Chernichah 
"Oppressed Shareholders in Close Corporations: A Market 
Oriented Remedy" ( 1994) 16 Cardozo Law Review 501; B 
Nicholson "The Fiduciary Duty of Close Corporation 
Shareholders: A Call for Legislation" ( 1992) 30 American 
Business Law Journal 513 . 
See for example New York Business Corporations Law 
sections 609 and 620; California Corporations Code 
sections 158, 705 and 706 . 
Man;<, 
law 
held 
for 
18 
closely held companies to elect to operate under. 28 Underlying most 
of these statutes is a company similar to the private company 
concept, with limited numbers of shareholders and restrictions on 
share transfers. Such companies can avoid almost all formalities 
associated with the company form, except capital maintenance and 
certain f iduc iar - and reporting du ties. 29 
The most significant concession allowed by these statutes is that 
by ~ay of shareholder agreement in the articles of association, the 
board of directors can be dissolved, and the affairs of the company 
managed by the shareholders. ~O If such an agreement is entered 
into, the shareholders generally assume the duties of a director. 
This flexibility recognises the identity between shareholders and 
management, and the desired informality of proceedings in closely 
held companies. It allows the business to be run in an informal 
partnership manner, yet with the associated benefits of 
incorporation. 
Howe er, it is interesting to note that to date studies in the 
United States have indicated that where some form of election is 
needed for a closely held compan) to gain the special benefits of 
close company legislation, few companies elect such treatment. 31 
This is particularly interesting in light of the current stud, 
which as will be explained, found that in New Zealand few closely 
held companies seem to be electing the constitutional variations to 
28 
29 
31 
See for example subchapter XIV of Delaware General 
Corporations Law; Model Statutory Close Corporations 
Supplement 1982. 
Above n 4, 104; Cary above n 26, 262. 
Delaware sections 350 and 351; New York section 620; 
California section 300; Model Statutory Close 
Corporations Supplement section 20. 
Above n J, 107; Cary above n 26, 268. 
19 
the new Act that would be expected. 
The latest trend in close company legislation in the Uni t ed States 
has been the conception of the Limited Liability Company . 
Between 1988 and 1997 some thirty states have enacted Limited 
Liability Company statutes . These allow f or a new form of business 
entity , which is a hybrid of the company and partnership forms , 
offering limited liability, as well as partnership taxation 
treatment. The business can also be managed in an informal 
partnership style , by agreement among the members , without a board 
of directors . Again however, studies show the popularit of the 
Limited Liability Company to be limited, al though recent trends 
s~ggest that its popularity is increasing as people become more 
familiar with its obvious benefits .
32 
C Austral ia 
Australia has enacted separate legislation for closely held 
companies in the form of the Close Corporations Act 1989 . In a 
similar vein to the legislation in the United States, this allo~s 
a predefined company, similar to the private company, to operate 
without a board of directors under the agreement of its members . 
Many administrative and reporting formalities usually associated 
with companies can also be avoided . 
33 
32 
33 
RW Hamilton Cases and Materials on Corporations (5ed , 
West Publishing Co , Minnesota , 1994) 183; WM Gazur "The 
Limited Liability Experi men t: Unlimited Flexibility , 
Uncertain Role " [ 1995] Law and Contemporary Pr oblems 
135 . 
R Tomaise et al Corporation Law (Butterworths , Sydney , 
1990) 150 . 
20 
D Canada 
In Canada, the approach has not been to make specific statutory 
pro,ision for closel held companies . Rather, the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act 1975 is designed as a flexible statute to cater 
for the needs of all companies. It is from this approach that the 
drafters of the new Act in New Zealand drew most heavily . 
As in the United States, the flexibility for closely held companles 
comes from specific statutory recognition of shareholder 
agreements. These can be used to displace the management of the 
company from the directors to the shareholders. 34 
E Separate Provision for Closely Held Companies? 
The flood of special statutes providing for closely held compani e s 
around the world has not been without its critiques. It is argued 
that the closely held company is a very arbitrary concept, and 
dlfficult to define for legislative purposes . 35 
Further, the need to specifically incorporate as a closely held 
company is seen as lmposing more complex formalities upon the 
members of such companies. This is where statutes like the Canadian 
Business Corporations Act, which are flexible enough to cater for 
closely held companies, but do not require such companies to 
specifically elect to receive special treatment are seen as ha ing 
34 
35 
Section 102 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act 
1975. See JS Ziegel et al Cases and Materials on 
Partnerships and Canadian Business Corporations ( 2ed , 
The Carswell Company , Toronto, 1989) 987; B Welling 
Corporaie Larr in Canada (2ecl, Butterworths, Toronto, 
1991) 481. 
Above n 4 , 118; I Ayres "Judging Close Corporations in 
the Age of Statutes" (1992) 70 Washington University Law 
QuarLerly 365 . 
21 
benefits . 36 
Special closely held company statutes typicall require complex 
arrangements to be completed , such as shareholder agreements for 
the management of the business . Few of the current statutes pro~ide 
standardised forms for such arrangements . The result is that many 
companies incorporate without these crucial control arrangements in 
place . 37 
It is also argued that the spartan nature of closely held company 
statutes can be off-putting to potential incorporators . The members 
of closely held c ompanies will generall want at least some rules 
to which the can have reference to in their operations, 
particularly in situations where there is doubt , or debate arises. 
Finally , few of the current specialist statutes provide protection 
for minority shareholders in the absence of special contractual 
arrangements. 38 
The above points are said to be underlined by the current low rate 
of incorporations under special closely held compan3 statutes. :9 
It was against this background that the Law Commission decided not 
to provide separate statutory provision for closelJ held companies . 
The Commission considered that the fundamental problem ¼ith such 
legislation was defining exactl what a closely held company is . 40 
36 Cary above 11 26, 266 . 
37 Above n 4 , 119 . 
38 Above n 4' 119. 
39 Above n 4) 119 . 
40 Above n 2 . 
22 
The Commission also pointed to low public support for such 
legislation . Instead , the Commission proposed legislation similar 
to that i n Canada , one flexible Act for all companies . The two main 
mechan i s ms for this flexibility are the con st i t u tion and section 
107 agreements . 
IV THE COMPANIES ACT 1993 
The new Act is different from its predecessor in lwo major aspects. 
First , the ne.-. Act purports to establish a complete regulatory 
framework for corporate governance . The old Act contained no 
go~ernance rules for the internal workings of a company, These were 
contained in a company's articles of association , a mandatory 
document for each company . The majority of companies adopted the 
Table A articles contained in the Third Schedule to the Act. These 
were designed to meet the needs of small private companies, 
al though how well they achieved this is debatable. 
41 The new Act 
contains a set of "off the rack" governance rules , which are 
presumed to apply unless displaced by the constitution .
42 
This leads to the second difference . The Act is a mixture of 
regulating and enabling legislation. 43 Instead of just specif ing 
how a company can operate, the Acl has many pro isions enabling a 
company a choice of operating style if the " off the rack " rules are 
41 
42 
43 
See RJ Bates Closely Held Companies and the Companies 
Bi 11: Too Close For Comfort ? ( LLM Research Paper , 
Victoria University of Wel l i ngton , 1991) 7. 
Abo e n 2 , 19 . 
Abo, e n 1 , 1 7 . 
23 
not seen as appropriate. However, there are still certain mandatory 
regulatory provisions. These generally provide for the protection 
of credi tars and minority shareholders, and include the duties 
imposed on directors , the solvency test and restrictions on 
altering shareholder rights. 44 
At first, the constitution was to be the only means by which to 
vary the statutory regime. This was subjected to criticism, as the 
constitution did not allow many of the formality rules which have 
no application to closely held companies to be avoided. 45 
The Commission was wary of extending the scope of the constituLion 
to allow it to be used to opt out of statutory formalities for two 
reasons . First, there would be no way to stop widel. held 
companies, at whom these rules are primarily aimed, from also 
opting out. Secondly , as the constitution could be altered by a 75% 
majority , it could be used as a means of prejudicial conduct 
against minority shareholders. 46 
The Commission found the solution in the shareholder agreement. As 
discussed above , the shareholder agreement is commonly used · .in 
North America to allow closely held companies to obviate 
unnecessary formalities, and run the · company in a manner agreed 
amongst themselves. 47 
45 
46 
Above n 2, 20. 
R Dugan "Closely Held Companies under the draft 
Companies Act " [1990] VUWLR 161. 
Above n 1, 26 . 
Above n 1, 29; Ziegel above n 34, 1004; above n 4, 86. 
See also G McCarthy "Shareholder Agreements" in /tferidith 
Memorial Lectures: Canadian Business Corporat .ions Act 
1975 (Richard De Boo Ltd , Toronto, 1975) 405; V 
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A Secti o n 107 Agreements 
Section 107 makes express provision for certain shareholder 
agreements, in an attempt to reduce the transactional formalities 
of the Act for closel,, held companies, 48 It provides that where all 
entitled persons agree, a c ompan y can carry out c ertain specified 
t r a nsactions without regard to the normal statutory formalities. 
The transactions specified in se c tion 107 include authorising 
di\ idends, purchase of own shares, share redemptions, providing 
financial assistance, issuing shares and authorising self-
in t e r ested transactions and directors remuneration. 
For e x ample, a closely held company can issue shares to its members 
under a section 107 agreement and avoid the regulator provisions 
of doing so under sections 42, 44 or 45. If the shares are issued 
under one of the latter se c tions, various requirements have to be 
met. These include the directors deciding the consideration for the 
shares, resolving that it is fair and reasonable to the company and 
all e x isting shareholders, and then certifying so. Failure to meet 
these requirements is an offence and carries a penalty ( up to 
$5000) . In a closely held company , where shares are often issued 
unpaid in return for such consideration as future services, the 
requirements are troublesome . 49 
Section 107 allows the company to issue the shares without regard 
to these formalities, and the accompanying liability. The only 
requirements are that all entitled persons agree in writing, and 
48 
4 9 
Goldwasser "Shareholder Agreements; Potent Protection 
for Minari ties in Close Corporations" ( 1994 ) 22 American 
Business Law Review 265 . 
Above n 2 , para 45. 
Above n 10 , 61. 
25 
that the solvency test be satisfied. 50 
Section 107 agreements can be either transaction specific o r 
general (ongoingJ. 51 Under a general agreement, an entitled person 
may withdraw their consent at any time by giving notice in 
writing, 52 Where a transaction is authorised under a general 
agreement, notice must be gi v en to all entitled persons within 10 
worklng days. 53 
Therefore the initial impression is that section 107 agreements 
provide a useful tool for closel held companies to operate without 
regard to the formalities of the et. While this is true to a large 
e x tent, there are some problems with the section 107 agreement 
mechanism which prevent it from being totally effective in 
pro iding for the needs of closely held companies 
1 Approval requirement 
Se ction 107 requires that all "entitled persons" agree to the 
transaction. "Entitled persons" is wider than shareholders, being 
defined in se c tion 2 as shareholders, and any persons upon whom the 
c onstitution confers any of the rights and powers of a shareholder. 
This is a considerable difference from the North American 
s hareholder agre ement, which as its name suggests requires only the 
a c tual shareholders of the company to agree, 54 The effect of the 
extension in the approval requirement could mean that a party 
outside of the company is required to give its approval to all 
50 Sections 107(4) and 108 . 
51 Section 107(5). 
52 Section 107( 6). 
53 Section 107(7). 
54 Above n 1, 33 . 
26 
section 107 agreements. This effectively defeats the purpose of the 
section itself , as it increases the transactional formalities. 
Further , it is strange that a party outside of the company should 
virtually have a veto power over all transactions , particularly 
those in which it has no real interest, f5 
2 Focus 
Another problem is the focus of section 107 . As noted, North 
American shareholder agreements are typically used to allow the 
shareholders to choose their own management structure , b • removing 
the board of directors and placing the management of the affairs of 
th . th . h d 56 e company 1n e1r own ans . 
In contrast, section 107 is limited in its focus to reducing the 
formalities associated with certain transactions. It cannot be used 
Lo dissolve the board of directors and vest the management of the 
company in the shareholders , 57 Rather , section 10 states that 
having at least one director is an essentia l requirement of a 
company , This means that many of the obligations that are imposed 
on the directors of a company, but serve no utility in a closely 
held company situation , cannot be avoided . 58 
3 Termi nati on Ri g ht 
The termination right contained in section 107 ( 6) also raises 
problems . This allows an entitled person to withdraw their consent 
H ., ' 
~6 
5 
58 
Above n 1, 34. 
Above n 47. 
AlLhough as 
variations to 
section 128. 
Above 11 1 , ~H. 
discussed further below constitutional 
the management regime can be made under 
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from a general agreement at any time by giving notice in writing. 
This right of withdrawal is not found in North American shareholder 
agreements. This has lead to some uncertainty over how such 
agreements can be undone. 
59 
Presumably the drafters of the New Zealand statute sought to 
clarify this issue, and also ensure that the members of companies 
did not become locked into agreements that became disagreeable to 
them. However, the termination right seems to be totally contrary 
to the principles of c ontract law, and in particular the sanctity 
6C of contract. 
The major problem caused b y the termination right is that it 
deprives a section 107 agreement of any certainty. This means that 
a section 107 agreement cannot be used to support a buy-out 
a greement. 61 A specific requirement of the closely held company i s 
that some mechanism be put in place to make the investment 
realisable upon a member's desire to exit the business. 
Under the new Act, there are several mechanisms for a dissenting 
shareholder to be bought out from the company. But as one would 
expect, they are designed for use in more widely held companies.
62 
This means that the members of closely held companies ~ill have to 
put in place their own mechanism, in the form of a buy-out 
agreement. Such agreements, stating that in the event that a member 
wishes to be released from the business, the company will purchase 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Welling above n 34, 481; McCarthy above n 47, 407. 
Above n 1, 36. 
Above n 10, 68; P Foley et al Nert' Zealand Law Society 
Seminar: Company Law - Practical Experience One Year On 
(NZLS, Wellington, 1995) 22. 
Sections 110, 118 and 174, See above n 10, 68. 
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her shares, are common in North American company law, and have long 
been a feature of partnership practice. 63 They are generally put 
in place at the time of incorporation, therefore giving the member 
the necessarJ assurance they need before investing. The agreement 
gives the investment the liquidity it would otherwise not possess, 
provides a form of dispute resolution, and prevents the investor 
from being locked into an oppressi e situation.
04 It also provides 
the remaining members with an element of control over the holdings 
in the company. 
Under the old et, the prohibition on a company purchasing its own 
shares prevented a buy-out agreement being put in place, unless the 
agreement provided that the other members bought the exiting member 
ouL personally. The obvious utility of buy-out agreements was one 
of the driving forces behind the re ersal of the prohibition on 
purchase of own shares in the new Act. It is therefore ironic that 
the new Act does not include a statutory mechanism for purchase of 
own shares suitable for supporting a buy-out agreement, including 
65 section 107 agreements. 
The agreement cannot be struc tured through any of the modes for 
repurchase in sections 58 to 65 . All require certain resolutions 
and certifications which cannot be made with certainty at the time 
the agreement is put in plac e. If they are left to be carried out 
at the time of the buy-out, the agreement loses the certainty which 
the investor requires. 66 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Above n -1, 86; Ziegel above n 31, 1002 , See also JH 
Choper et al Cases and Materials on Corporations (3ed, 
Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1989) 684. 
Above n 10, 68 . 
Above n 10, 68 , 
Above n 10, 68. 
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Nor can a section 107 agreement be used to support the buy-out. 
Although it allows a company to purchase its own shares otherwise 
than in accordance with sections 58 to 65, the section 107 ( 6) 
termination right allows any of the members to withdraw at any 
time , bringing the agreement down . Again , this deprives the 
agreement of the certaint) that it requires, especially hhen one 
considers that the right of withdrawal is most likely to be 
exercised in thee ent of a dispute among the members . This is the 
very situation that the buy-out agreement tries to deal with. 61 
To effectively put in place a buy-out agreement under the Act, 
members of a closely held company will have to resort to tactics 
such as redeemable shares, shareholder agreements outside the Act, 
or drafting such agreements as specific ones under section 
105(5)(a) which cannot be withdrawn from . All of these increase the 
paperwork and formalities for members. 
The Act, and in particular section 107 agreements, which purports 
to make life easier for closely held companies , is seriously flawed 
in the fact that it cannot provide for this common facet of closely 
held business practice , 68 
4 Notice requirement 
Where a power is e x erc ised under a general assent , section 107(7) 
requires that notice in writing be given to all entitled persons. 
Again , this feature of shareholder agreements is not found in North 
America , and is arguably an unnecessar formali t, - , 69 The 
67 
68 
69 
Above n 10, 69. 
Above n 1, 30, 
Above n 1, 39; Ziegel above n 34, 1002 . 
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requirement is also strange in that the notice follows the event .
70 
It is not clear whether an entitled person upon receiving notice 
can withdraw their consent after the power has been exercised and 
the transaction completed , and what the consequences of this would 
be. 
5 New members 
The effect of a change in membership in a closel) held company with 
general section 107 agreements in place is not clear In North 
America, this issue has been resolved by statutor provisions which 
make the transferee of shares which are sub j ect to shareholder 
agreements a party to such agreements if they have actual or 
onstructive notice of them. 71 No such provision exists under the 
section 107 regime. 
From a contractual point of view , the departure of a member would 
seem to indicate an end to any agreements , meaning that they would 
have to be reconstituted to include the new member. 
72 
This would 
also be consistent with partnership law , which is based on the 
principles of contract , and requires all agreements to be 
reconstituted upon the departure of a member, unless provision for 
continuation is made . 
6 Formalities 
It is arguable that in certain instances, section 107 agreements 
can actually defeat their own purpose, 
70 
71 
72 
Above n 1, 39 . 
Ziege l above n 34, 1002. 
Above n 1, 40 . 
and impose increased 
31 
transactional formalities than would otherwise be experienced. "J 
An example of this can be seen with director's remuneration. 
If remuneration is authorised under the standard provision of 
section 161, the only formalities required are a resolution and 
certification that the remuneration is fair to the company, and an 
entry into the i .nterests register. 
74 
In comparison, if the remuneration is authorised by agreement under 
section 107(1)(f), the consent of all entitled persons, which might 
include a party outside of the company is needed. The solvency test 
must also be resolved and certified under section 108. If the 
remuneration is to be recurring, specific assent is required each 
time, or if a general assent is used, notice must be gi~en to all 
entitled persons each time. 
Contrary to policy, the formalities of using section 107 seem to 
far outweigh those of section 161. 
7 Scope 
It is unclear why section 107 is 1 imi ted in its scope to the 
transactions contained therein. There are other rules contained . in 
the Act that would also seem to be appropriate for authorisation by 
agreement, Examples are section 145 pertaining to the use of 
company information, and indemnification and insurance under 
section 162. Both of these provisions aim to protect shareholders 
from director mismanagement. But in a closely held company where 
there is no separation of ownership and control theJ are 
unnecessary, and should be susceptible to avoidance by a section 
Above n 10, 183, 
Sections 161(2) and (4). 
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107 agreement. 7E 
The foregoing discussion presupposes that those transactions that 
can be authorised by agreement are limited to those contained in 
section 107. However, this is far from clear. 
At common law, the doctrine of unanimous shareholder assent allowed 
a court to accord validity to something which had been agreed to by 
all the shareholders, even though the proper formalities had not 
been complied with. ry 6 
In comparison with section 107, the common law doctrine is clearly 
more informal and permissive. Unlike section 107, no writing is 
required, and assent can be inferred from silence in the face of an 
irregularity. Further, unanimity requires only the assent of 
those members entitled to vote on the matter, not all entitled 
persons as under section 107, which is much wider.
78 
Clearly section 107 excludes the use of the more informal common 
la ... · assent doctrine for the transactions specified therein. 
79 
However, the question which arises is whether the doctrine 
continues to exist outside of those transactions. The effect of a 
7, ,. 
77 
78 
79 
Above 11 1, 40. 
Salomon v Salomon & Co [1897] AC 22; Re Duomatic Ltd 
(1969] 1 All ER 161; ffestpac Securities Ltdv Kensington 
(1994] 2 NZLR 555. See above 11 23, 217; LS Sealy Cases 
and /tfaterials in Company Larv (Butterworths, London, 
1992} 166; R Grantham "The Unanimous Consent Rule in 
Company Law" [1993] CLJ 245. 
Re Bailey, HaJ' & Co Ltd [1971] 3 All ER 693. 
Re Duomatic above 11 76. 
A Beck et al Norison 's Company and Securities Law 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1994) 25-10. 
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positive answer would be to greatly facilitate the operations of 
closely held companies, as the doctrine suits their informal 
nature. 
It has been argued that section 104, which requires powers reserved 
to shareholders to be exercised at a meeting properly called, or by 
a resolution in lieu under section 122, leaves little room for the 
common law position to continue. gr 
Further, the fact that the drafters consciously defined the 
transactions that can be authorised by agreement under section 107 
is also said to weigh against the continuance of the common law.
81 
Added to this, section 128 clearly vests the management of the 
company in the board. 82 
Those who argue in favour of the continuance of the common law 
point to section 177(4). This preserves the common law relating to 
ratification and approval of shareholders. Alongside this, section 
128(3) was amended at the same time that section 177(4) was 
included, to make the rule of management by the board subject to 
other provisions of the Act .
82 
It is also notable that even though section 128 ( 1) does confer 
management upon the board, so too did article 80 of the old Table 
A articles, and yet the common law doctrine was still seen to apply 
to companies operating under these. 
84 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
Above n 23 , 217. 
Above n 23, 217. 
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Overall, the issue remains unresolved until judicial or legislative 
clarification is recei"\ed. However, it is clear that the 
continuation of the common law position would be of assistance for 
closely held companies by helping to widen the limited scope of 
section 107. 
8 Summary 
At first instance, section 107 appears as a beneficial device for 
closely held companies to obviate unnecessary statutory 
formalities. However, closer inspection reveals that the uplifting 
a facet of North American law and implanting it into the foreign 
surrounds of New Zealand's Companies Act has raised some 
difficulties. In particular, the glosses that ha e been added make 
it far more restrictive than its North American counterpart. There 
is also the question of its impact on the common law doctrine of 
unanimous shareholder assent , which is quite unclear. The net 
effect is that section 107 provides for the needs of closely held 
companies with limited success. 
B The Constitution 
The second, and primary mechanism for varying the statutory regime 
is the constitution. As stated earlier, the new Act contains two 
major changes in approach. It provides a complete set of governance 
rules for the internal workings of a company, and it contains a 
significant amount of enabling legislation, which allows a company 
a choice of var ing these rules. The result of these changes is 
that the constitution has a very different role to play compared to 
the articles of association. 85 A constitution is not mandatory.
86 
35 Above n 1, 18. 
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As the Act itself contains all the rules which are necessary for a 
company to function , a company can operate without a constitution 
using the presumptive provisions of the Act as its governance 
regime . 87 However, as many companies , in particular closely held 
ones, will find the presumptive provisions of the Act undesirable, 
a constitution can be used to negate or modify them . 
8 The 
provisions of the Act can be classified into three categories in 
terms of their relationship with the constitution: 
1 Presumpt i v e p r ovisi on s 
The presumptive provisions of the Act are those that expressly 
anticipate negation or modification b) the constitution . They are 
presumed to apply unless the constitution specifies otherwise. An 
example is section 36 , which presumes all shares to be equal and 
carry standard rights , unless varied by the constitution . 
2 Opti onal p r o v is i ons 
The Act contains certain provisions which require constitutional 
authorisation before a company can proceed under them . Such 
provisions include the purchase of own shares under section 59, and 
the indemnifying and insuring of directors and employees under 
section 162. 
86 
87 
88 
Section 26 . 
Section 28. 
Section 27. 
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3 Mandatory provisions 
Certain provisions of the Act expressly state that they cannot be 
altered by the constitution. An example is section 106, which lists 
the powers reserved for shareholders which are required to be 
exercised by special resolution. 
A significant number of provisions in the Act are silent and make 
no reference to the constitution, Most commentators have stated 
that these are also mandatory provisions and cannot be altered, 
89 
The) argue that section 31 would invalidate any change to these 
provisions, as they would invariably be inconsistent with , or in 
contravention of the Act. 
It has also been argued that these provisions are susceptible to 
alteration . 90 The reason for th i s is that there is a presumption 
that you may contract out of any legislation, unless it expressly 
prohibits you from doing so. However, the problem with this 
argument is that section 31 leaves little room for any changes. It 
was the experience of the study that the drafters of constitutions 
treated thes e provisions as mandatory, with few deliberate attempts 
made to vary them . 
The foregoing discussion illustrates a point of much debate since 
the inception of the new Act; the uncertainty of the mandatory 
core. The Act is clearly meant to have a set of unalterable 
regulatory rules , focusing around the protection of creditors and 
89 
9~ 
A Beck et al Ner,' Zealand Company Lar\1 and Practice (CCH 
NZ Ltd , Auckland, 1997) Rg 8-320; Above n 23 , 31; P 
Radich et al New Zealand La.rt' Society Seminar: 
Reregistra.tion of Companies - Doing the job properly 
(NZLS, Wellington, 1997) ll. 
Above n 1, 24. 
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minority shareholders. 91 However the inconsistent drafting 
techniques employed in the Act, and the uncertainty of the scope of 
the constitution and other ariance tools like section 107, make 
defining the core rules very hard. 92 
With this regulatory framework in mind, the constitution was 
deliberately left as an "empty set", with no prescribed model or 
form. 37 Companies are free to fill them as they wish in order to 
alter the statutory framework to suit their particular needs. The 
contents of the constitution are anticipated as containing:
1 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Alterations to presumptive 
provisions; and 
Adoption of optional provisions; and 
Adoption of supplementary provisions 
dealing with matters upon which the 
Act is silent . 
The scope of the constitution is defined by sections 16 and 31. 
Section 16 provides that the constitution may only limit ( not 
extend) the capacity, 1ights and powers of the company. Section 31 
provides that the constitution has no effect to the extent that it 
contravenes or is inconsistent with the Act . 
The change in approach in the new Act, and the novel concept of the 
constitution, led to much anticipation and comment on the form that 
91 Above n 2' 20 . 
92 Above n 1, 178. 
93 .\bove n 1, 20. 
9~ Section 30 . 
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company constitutions should take. 95 The remainder of this paper 
examines what is taking place with the constitutions of closely 
held companies in New Zealand. 
V THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of the study are: 
( i) 
(ii ) 
(iii) 
( i V) 
(v) 
( vi) 
95 
To ascertain the incidence of 
closely held companies registering 
constitutions. 
To ascertain whether there are any 
trends toh·ards standard form or 
tailor-made constitutions. 
To identify 
pro isions of 
the 
the 
presumptive 
Act being 
displaced by the constitutions. 
To identify the optional provisions 
of the Act being adopted. 
To identify the supplementary 
provisions being included to provide 
for matters on which the Act is 
sjlent . 
To see if the constitutions are 
See for example MA O'Regan et al Ner,, Zealand Law Society 
Seminar: Compan,v Constitutions ( ZLS , Wellington, 1995); 
Phillips Fox New Company Law - How it ,J.ffects You (CCH 
NZ Ltd, Auckland, 1993); New Zealand DepartmenL of 
Justice The 1993 Companies Pad.age: How it Affecls Your 
Company (Wellington, 1994); Ernst &Young Guide to the 
Companies Act 1993 (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1994). 
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appropriate for closely held 
companies in terms of both their 
contents and drafting styles. 
VI METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
A sample of 100 closely held companies was obtained. 
36 This was 
achieved by randomly selectin public files of registered companies 
held by the companies office on 27 and 28 July 1997. The file of 
each company was analysed, and the details of the constitution 
recorded if one was registered. 
The companies were then categorised into: 
( i ) 
(ii) 
One person companies. 
Multi-person companies. 
This distinction is made for two reasons. 
First, the results indicated that the one person compan-y is a 
popular entity, accounting for roughly half of the sample. 
Secondly, as outlined earlier, the centralisation of control in a 
one person company remo es man-y of the problems encountered in a 
company with several members. A one person compan-y can operate 
satisfactorily under the presumptive provisions of the Act without 
96 Closely held company being defined as a compan:r 
comprising of six or fewer members, including one person 
companies. 
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a constitution. 97 
In fact, man) of the presumptive provisions of the Act suit a one 
person company, such as the rule in section 111 that an interested 
director may partake in a transaction, and the ability of the board 
to remunerate a director under section 161. 98 Section 107 allows 
a one person compan) Lo opt out of many of the formalities of the 
Act, and enter into transactions that would otherwise require 
constitutional authorisation, such as the purchase of own shares. 
As a result, it was considered that the constitutional practices of 
one person companies deserved to be singled out for separate 
analysis. 
Hav ing distinguish d between two c ategories of closely held 
companies, the analysis focused on the incidence and nature of the 
regisLered constitutions. Table 1 sets out the results. It lists 
tl1e number of constitutions found to be registered in the sample, 
and gives an indication of the incidence of the most popular 
standard form constitutions. 
The contents of the sample constitutions were then examined to 
ascertain the approaches to the different pro,isions in the Act. 
Table 2 shows the presumptive pro is ions of the Act, and Lhe 
incidence of modifications to them found in the constitutions. 
Table 3 shows the adoption of the optional provisions of the Act. 
Finally Table 4 sets out the supplementary pro isions found to be 
contained in the constitutions. 
97 
98 
Above n 1, 12. 
R Dugan "Reregistration of Closely Held Companies " 
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TABLE 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL USAGE AMONG CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 
ONE PERSON MULTI-PERSON I TOTAL 
COMPANIES COMPANIES 
NUMBER {100) 51 49 100 
,I 
CONSTITUTION 46 (90%) 37 (76%) 83 (83%) 
,1 REGISTERED I 
Constitution A 11 (24%) 8 ( 22%) 19 (23%) 
,I 
Constitution B 8 ( 1 7%) 8 (22%) 
I 16 (19%) ~ I 
Constitution C 9 ( 20%} 0 9 ( 11%) 
Constitution D 1 ( 2%) 4 ( 11%) 5 (6%) 
Other 14 ( 30%) 19 (45%) 33 (40%) 
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TABLE 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODIFICATIONS OF PRESUMPTIVE PROVISIONS BY CLOSELY 
HELD COMPANIES 
PRESUMPTIVE l CHANGES BY CHANGES BY TOTAL (83) 
1 PROVISIONS COMPANIES j ONE PERSON MULTI
-PERSON 
I ACT '93 I COMPANIES COMPANIES 
11 ( 3 7) 
ri 
(46) 
1 SHARES & SHAREHOLDERS 
All shares equal (s36) 23 (51%) 29 (78%
) 52 (63%) 
, Differ ent share classes 1 ( 2%) 4 (
11%) 5 ( 6%) 
I (s 37l 
I Unrestricted share 12 (27%) 8 ( 22%) 
20 (24%) 
issues (s42) 
Pro-rata share issues 1 ( 2%) 3 
(8%) 1 ( 5%) 
(s45) 
Unrestricted 20 ( -14%) 22 (5
9%) 42 (51%) 
, distributions (s52) 
~ Shares in li eu (s54) 0 0 0 
~ Shares freely 34 (76%) 36 (97%) 70 (85%) 
1 transferable (s39) 
' 
I No right to refuse 33 (73%) 36 (97%) 69 (8
4%) 
r egistration of 
transfers (s84) 
DIRECTORS 
Appointed by ordinary 
I 10 (22%) 8 ( 22%) 18 (22%) 
I resolution (s153) 
Removed by ordinary 2 (4%) 1 ( 3
%) 3 (4%) 
resolution (s156) 
Appointed individually .n (91%) 35 (95%) 76 (93%) 
(s155) 
Remuneration (s161) 18 ( 40%) 8 (22%) 26 (32%) 
MANAGEMENT 
I 
Special r esolution 75% 0 0 0 
(s2) 
Powers exercised by 12 (27%) 8 (22%) 20 (24%) 
or dinary resolution I 
(s105) 
I Shareholder meetings by 34 (76%) 35 (90%) 69 ( 8-1%) 
1st schedule (s124) 
Shareholder r esolutions 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 2 (2%) 
not binding on the 
board (sl09(3)) 
Management by board 1 (2%) 3 (8%) 4 (5%) I 
(s128) 
Board proceedings by 41 (91%) 36 (97%) 77 (94%) I 
3rd schedule (s160) I 
Delegation (s130) 0 0 0 
In t erested director can 0 0 0 I participate (s144) 
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TABLE 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADOPTION OF OPTIONAL PROVISIONS BY CLOSELY HELD 
COMPANIES 
~ OPTIONAL PROVISIONS I CHANGES BY CHANGES BY TOTAL I COMPANIES ACT '93 ONE PERSON MULTI- (83) 
COMPANIES PERSON 
(46) COMPANIES 
I - ( 3 7) I 
I Purchase of own shares (s59) 34 (76%) 37 (100%) 71 (87%) 
I Hold own shares (S67A) 21 (47%) 26 (70%) 47 (57%) I 
Ji Issue redeemable shares 22 (49%) 22 (59%) 44 (54%) Ii ( s68) 
r Person authorised to call 3 (7%) 3 ( 8%) 6 (7%) 
I special meeting (s121) 
I Specify terms of directors' 18 (40%) 26 (70%) 34 (41%) I removal (s157) 
I Indemnity and insurance 45 (100%) 37 (100%) 82 
I (s162) (100%) 
Person authorised to enter 3 ( 7%) 2 ( 3%) 5 ( 6%) deeds (s180) 
Person authorised to remove 25 (56%) 21 (57% ) 46 (56%) I company from register (s318) 
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TABLE 4 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADOPTION OF SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS BY CLOSELY HELD 
COMPANIES 
SUPPLEMENTARY ADOPTION BY ADOPTION BY TOTAL 
PROVISIONS NOT ONE PERSON MULTI-PERSON (83) 
PROVIDED FOR IN THE COMPANIES COMPANIES 
COMPANIES ACT '93 (46) (37) 
Pre-emptive share transfer 34 ( 76%) 36 (97%) 70 (85%) 
rights 
Calls on unpaid shares 43 (96%) 36 (97%) 79 (96%) ! 
Liens and forf e iture for 30 (67%) 34 (92%) 64 (78%) 
unpaid shares 
Alternate and managing 42 (93%) 35 (95%) 77 (94%) 
directors 
Dispute resolution 12 (27%) 11 (30%) 23 (28%) I 
Procedure for polls at 30 (67%) 32 (86%) 62 (76%) 
shareholder meetings 
Form of proxies for 27 (60%} 32 (86%} 59 (72%) 
shareholder meetings 
Like documents for 39 (87%) 73 (89%} 72 (88%) 
resolutions in lieu 
Service of notices 32 (70%) 30 (81%) 62 (70%) 
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VII ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
A Use of Constitutions by Closely Held Companies 
The study recorded a high incidence of registration of 
constitutions among the sample. This is attributed to a bias 
towards recently incorporated companies in the sample. Most of the 
companies without constitutions were ones incorporated under the 
old Act, which had been deemed to be reregistered under the new 
Act. This means that the company has no constitution. The old 
articles cease to have effect, and the presumptive provisions of 
the Act apply. 99 
To find that one person companies had a higher rate of 
constitutional usage than multi-person companies was interesting. 
It was anticipated that a one person company could operate 
sufficiently under the Act without a constitution. IOO In contrast , 
the nature of a multi-person company will typically necessitate a 
constitution, to protect the interests of the members. 
It is submitted that this variance in the results to what was 
expected may also be attributable to deemed reregistration. As one 
person companies were not available under the old Act, they would 
either have to of been incorporated under the new Act. If they had 
been incorporated under the old et with a notional second 
shareholder, they would have to of been reregistered under the new 
Act with a conversion to a single shareholder. Such action would 
have presented those carrying out the formalities with the 
99 
IO C 
Section 13 and the Schedule of the Companies 
Reregistration Act 1993. 
Above n 1, 12; see also Radich above n 89, 18, 
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opportunity to register a constitution, which many seem to have 
done. 
However, with regard to multi-person companies, many have not 
bothered to reregister under the new Act, with the conseque11ce of 
deemed re registration . 101 The result is they have no constitution, 
and operate under the presumptive provisions of the Act . This is a 
situation which is likely to cause many companies problems in the 
near future, as the interests of the members will not be protected 
under the presumptive provisions. 
B Standard Form v Tailor-Made Constitutions? 
As predicted by the Law Commission, standard form constitutions 
were found to be prevalent. In particular, several standard form 
constitutions were found to very popular, as Table 1 illustrates. 
Constitution A, the product of a legal publishing firm, was by far 
the most popular, accounting for around a quarter of the 
constitutions registered. Constitution B was also the product of a 
legal publishing firm, while constitution C belonged to a large 
chartered accountants firm. Constitution D, and man. of the other 
constitutions, were precedent constitutions developed by large law 
firms. The similarity of the contents of these standard form 
constitutions was high, as will become apparent from the following 
analysis. Few seemed to be tailor-made for the needs of a 
particular company, cont1·ary to the Law Commission's expectation 
that the deviance of closely held companies would lead to such 
practices. 
10 I M Ross "Deemed Reregistration: What Happens Next 0 " 
(1997) 76 Chartered Accountants' Journal of New Zealand 
33. 
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C Modifications to Presumptive Provisions 
1 Share righls and classes 
Under the statutory regime all shares are equal, and carry standard 
rights as to participation in voting and distributions. 102 This may 
be varied by either the constiLution or the terms of issue under 
section 42.JO~ 
Alteration of the rights attaching to shares is one way for a 
closely held company to cater for the differing interests of its 
members . 104 This is an area where many companies will run into 
trouble with deemed reregistration, as their unique capital 
structures will no L be preserved . 105 
,The majod ty of the constitutions varied the section 36 
presumption, by allowing differentiation between the dividend and 
voting rights attaching to shares. This included three quarters of 
the multi-person company constitutions. The number of one person 
compan,' constitutions providing for the alteration of share rights 
was interesting, as this is unnecessary where one person holds all 
the shares. This is symptomatic of one person companies using 
constitutions designed for companies with several members, a 
feature which appears constant!} throughout the study. 
Consistent with the results under section 36 were those for section 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Section 36. 
Section 36(2). 
E Abernethy "The Case for ConstiLutions" (1994) 416 Law 
Talk 11. 
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37. The presumption under this section is that a company may issue 
different types or classes of shares, unless the constitution 
states otherwise. Very few of the constitutions negated or varied 
this provision. 
2 Share issues 
The Act enables the board to issue shares as it sees fit, unless 
restricted by the constitution. 106 However, existing shareholders 
have a pre-emptive right to new shares. This is also subject to 
variation by the constitution, :o7 
Depending upon the configuration of control in a multi- erson 
compan , the members may want to restrict the board's power to 
issue shares, or waive the pre-emptive rights on new issues . In 
particular, the former ma · be true where one member ls to manage 
Lhe business, while the others take more passive roles. In this 
case the others will invarlabl wish to keep a check over the 
manager's power Lo issue shares. Unless they wish to be directors, 
the only wa) to do this is to require some form of shareholder 
. 103 appro~al for share issues, 
Changes to these provisions were only moderatel · popular. Around 
one quarter of the constitutions restricted the board's power to 
issue shares , while only a few waived the pre-emptive right . Those 
constitutions tl1at restricted the board's power to issue typically 
did so b-y imposing a special resolution requirement. Presumably 
many members of closel held companies see sec Lion -15 as an 
adequate safeguard to their interests, gi"en the low incidence of 
106 
107 
108 
Section 42 . 
Section -15. 
bove n 10, 66. 
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changes to section 42 and the even lower number to section 45. 
3 Transferability of shares 
Section 39 makes shares in a compan freely transferable, subject 
to an restrictions in the company's constitution. Correspondingly, 
section 8--1- ( --1-) places a duty upon the board to register share 
transfers, unless the constitution permits the board to refuse or 
delay doing so for stated reasons . 
The stud:, confirmed the concern of closely held companies to be 
able to restrict the free transferability of shares . Nearly all of 
the constitutions negated section 39, b~ requiring shares to be 
offered first to the remaining shareholders. Again there was a high 
incidence of one person companies making an alteration that has no 
applicability to them. 
Correspondingl), almost all of the constitutions gave reasons for 
the board to refuse or delay registration of transfers, as 
anticipated by section 84(4). It was interesting to note that some 
constitutions used wording such as "the board shall ha e absolute 
discretion to refuse or delay registration" or "the directors may 
decline to register the transfer of any shares to any person 
without giving any reason for such refusal'' . It has been suggested 
that such provisions, which are a hangover from the old Act , are 
invalid . Section 84 ( <-!) requires reasons for Lhe refusal to be 
slated, but the implication of these sorts of provisions is that no 
1 easons need be given, 109 
109 DO Jones· Company Larv in Neh' Zealand: A Guide to the 
CompaniesAct 1993(Butterworths, 'l\ellington , 1993) 37 . 
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4 Distributions 
Section 52 authorises the board to make distributions at any time, 
of any amount, and to any persons it thinks fit. The section 
.anticipates limitation by the constitution. Under section 53, 
dividends are required to be pro rata, and can be authorised on 
unpaid shares. Section 53 can be avoided in a closel held company 
situation by the use of a section 107 agreement. 
In a closel held company , the internal configuration of control 
may mean that some restriction on the board's power to authorise 
distributions is desirable. Again this is most lil ely to occur 
where one party is to actively manage the business, .-:hile the 
others take a passive role. 110 
It is interesting to compare the regime for dividends under the uew 
Act, with the former common law position . The latter appears to 
accord more kith the needs of closely held companies . 
Historically companies were established by deed of settlement. The 
directors were regarded as trustees of the funds and roperty under 
the deed. Consent of the shareholders was therefore required before 
any distributions of the property could be made . 111 
This position has been carried by wa of analog into company law 
under general incorporation. Most of the articles of companies 
provided for the declaration of dividends by the shareholders in 
general meeting, subject to the proviso that the dividend could not 
exceed an amount recommended bj, the directors . 112 This was also the 
110 
111 
112 
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position under the Table A articles of the old Act in New Zealand , 
adopted by most private companies , 113 The presumpti e regime of the 
new Act therefore represents an about turn in focus , placing the 
control of di idends with the board . 
A mixed approach to altering the regime for distributions was found 
among the constitutions . About one half limited the board's power 
to authorise distributions, by imposing some form of shareholder 
approval requirement . 
It was surprising to find that a number of the constitutions 
imposed a stricter dividend regime than that under the Act , 
limiting dividends proportionate! to a mounts paid on shares. This 
is not in the interests of members of closely held companies , where 
shares are often issued unpaid . 114 
The only other presumptive provision in the statutory regime for 
distributions is that shares may be issued in lieu of dividends . 11 5 
None of the constitutions negated this rule . 
5 Appo i ntme n t a nd r emov a l o f directo rs 
Under the Act directors are appointed and removed by wa of 
ordinary resolution , 116 
Surprising ! few consLitutions changed these pro ision s . Security 
of tenu re i n manage ment is i mportant to the members of closely held 
compan i e s , to protect their i nterests and avoid a II freeze-out 11 
113 Article 114 . 
114 Above n 10 , 61. 
115 Section 54 . 
116 Sect i ons 153 and 156 . 
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scenario. An ordinary resolution requirement will not normall be 
an adequate safeguard . 111 
Those that did alter the regime did so by imposing a special 
resolution requirement, or creating special classes of shares, each 
with the right to appoint and remove one director . 
Almost all of the constitutions allowed the directors to be elected 
as a panel, negating the statutor presumption that they be elected 
one at a time . 118 
6 Directors' remuneration 
Section 161 permits the board to authorise the pa "ment of 
remuneration , and the giving of other benefits to directors. This 
provision is subject to restrictions in the constitution. 
Around one third of the constitutions negated or limited the 
presumption . This is consistent with closely held companies where 
one member is to actively manage the business. It was surprising to 
find a number of the one person companies making such dn 
alteration, as this presumption Kould appear to be in their 
interests . Director remuneration can be a convenient wa) for the 
member to withdraw a salary from the business . 11 9 
Constitution B , the second most popular constitution, had an 
interesting provision in relation to directors' remuneration. 
Section 161 sets out the types of remuneration and benefits that 
may be authorised, and states that the constitution may onl~ 
l P 
11 8 
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restrict these . Constitution B purported to allow remuneration lo 
be made to a dead director ' s spouse and children , which would 
appear to be an extension rather Lhan a restriction of section 16 1. 
As such , it would appear to be ineffective. 120 
7 Sh areho l der resolu ti ons 
Under the statutory regime , powers reserved for shareholders are 
exercised by ordinary resolution (simple majorit ), except certain 
specified transactions which require special resolution approval 
(75%). 121 The latter include adopting and altering a constitution , 
and approving major transactions . 
Certain changes can be made to the statutory regime. Powers 
otherwise exercisable by ordinar resolution can be made subject to 
a higher threshold , such as a special resolution . However, section 
106 expressly states that the powers subject to special resolution 
cannot be altered by the constitution. The only change that can be 
made in respect of these is that the special resolution percentage 
1? ') 
may be raised ( not lowered) . '"" 
Few of the constitutions altered this reg i me. Of those that did, 
the most common change was to make transactions normally subject to 
ordinary resolutions, subject to special resolutions. Not one of 
the constitutions raised the special resolution requirement above 
7 5% for any transaction . 
In this regard the constitutions were clearl ' inappropriate for 
closely held companies. Without alteration , the statutor) regime 
120 
12 
122 
Above n 23 , 62. 
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will typically not give the members, particularly those in the 
minority, a say in fundamental decisions, which they will want to 
protect their interests . 12 3 
8 Shareholder meetings 
Powers reserved to be exercised by shareholders can be exercised 
• 2 A either at a meeting, or by resolution in lieu of a meeting. " · 
Shareholder meetings, subject to variation by the constitution , are 
governed by the First Schedule to the Act . 125 
The majority of the constitutions made some change to the 
provisions of the First Schedule. The most common were raising the 
requirement for a quorum, entitling the chairperson to ha, e a 
casting vote, and adding supplementary provisions on the conducting 
of polls and the form of proxies. 
These changes are consistent with the nature of a closely held 
company . Although resolutions in lieu of meetings will generally be 
used as they are easier , meetings will still sometimes be 
necessary. One person companies on the other hand can always use 
resolutions in lieu. It was therefore surprising to find many of 
them making these changes. 
Interestingly, few of the constitutions negated the presumption 
that shares with unpaid calls could not be voted on. As shares in 
closely held companies are often issued unpaid, this might c ause 
some problems . 126 
123 Above n 10, 67. 
124 Section 104 . 
125 Section 124 . 
126 Above n 1 , 147. 
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9 Management 
The Act presumes that the management of a company rests with the 
po 
board." Shareholders may pass resolutions pertaining to the 
management of the compan , but they are 
board . 128 The principle of director management 
the constitution. Management powers can 
not 
can 
be 
binding on the 
be displaced by 
ested in the 
shareholders, and shareholder resolutions can be made binding upon 
the board. 129 
Few of the constitutions took the oppor t unit y to displace the 
presumption of director management. This is strange as the ability 
to do so is directly aimed at closel held companies, based on 
similar provisions overseas, It recognises the unity between 
ownership and management in closely held companies, and the desired 
informality of proceedings, 130 
This result is similar to studies in the United States, which have 
found that the number of closely held companies actually electing 
to receive the special statutory benefits conferred upon them is 
low . 131 It is hard to explain why this is so, Perhaps the members 
of closely held companies are more familiar and comfortable with 
the traditional company structure, where the directors manage the 
business. Also, as the Act requires a company to have at least one 
director, many bompanies probably see it as easier to leave the 
management in the hands of the directors. 
127 Section 128. 
128 Section 109. 
129 Section 128(3) and 109(3). 
13 0 Above n 2. 
131 Above n 31. 
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1 0 Proceedi ngs of t he board 
Under the Act , the proceedings of the board are governed by the 
Third Schedule . This is subject to variation by the 
. . 13? constitution. " 
As with shareholder meetings, nearly all of the constitutions made 
changes to the proceedings for directors ' meetings. The most common 
changes were extending the period of notice , raising the quorum, 
and enabling the chairperson to have a casting vote. 
11 Deleg ation 
Section 130 allows the board to delegate its powers, other tha n 
those specified in the Sec ond Schedule, subject to any restrictions 
in the c onstitution . 
~one of the constitutions took the opportunity to restrict t his 
power of the board . In a closely held company it might be 
appropriate to limit the power of delegation , in order to protect 
the interests of members . 133 
Many of the constitutions made a basic error by providing that the 
bo a rd could delegate any of its powers. Clearly this is in 
contravention of se c tion 130, which by way of the Second Schedule 
specifies certain powers which cannot be delegated , These include 
the powers to issue shares and authorise distributions . 
13 2 
133 
Section 160 . 
Above n 10, 71. 
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12 Interested directors 
The presumption under the Act is that a director who is interested 
in a certain transaction may vote, and otherwise act in relation to 
that transaction . 13 4 
Interestingly , none of the constitutions negated the statutory 
presumption . While it is in the interests of a one person company , 
it may not be so in one with several members , where one is to 
a ct i\el) mana ge the business , while the others take passi e 
1 r, 
r o les . · " 
D Adoption of Option a l Provisions 
1 Purch a s e of own s hares 
A c ompany c annot purchase or oth erwise acquire it s own shares 
unless it has constitutional authorisation . 136 Fo r a closely held 
company , the ability to purchase its own shares can provide a tax 
effective method for distributions . 137 Also as discussed above , it 
c an be used to buy out a dissenting or departing shareholder . 1~8 
Constitutional authorisation for the purchase of own shares can be 
circumvented in a closely held compan situation by a section 107 
agreement . This als o has the attraction of a voiding many of the 
transactional forma l ities and liabilities c ontained in sections 58 
through to 65 . Therefore, for a c losel held c ompany , 
134 Section 144 . 
135 Above n 10 , 71. 
136 Section 59 . 
137 Above n 7 ' 71. 
138 Radich above n 89 , 35 . 
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constitutional authorisation for the purchase of own shares is onl · 
needed as a back up procedure, in the event that the necessarl 
agreement under section 107 cannot be obtained. 
Almost all of the constitutions authorised the purchase of own 
shares . The majority of the one person company constitutions also 
contained such authorisation . This is unnecessary, as section 107 
is always available and preferable for such a compan) . 
Many of the constitutions authorised the purchase of own shares b • 
methods that are not applicable to closely held companies , namel) 
the sections 63 and 65 "on market " acquisitions . This is totally 
inappropriate and makes little sense in a constitution designed for 
such a company. 
Around one half of the constitutions authorised the companies to 
hold shares that they had acquired as treasur3 stock , as 
contemplated by section 67A. Again this is unnecessary in a closel, 
held company situation . 
2 Redeemable shares 
With the problems associated with using the purchase of own shares 
for a buy-out agreement , redeemable shares may be the best way for 
a closely held company to implement such an arrangement under the 
Act . Section 68 requires constitutional authorisation for the issue 
of redeemable shares . Unlike many of the other transactions under 
the Act , this cannot be circumvented through a section 107 
agreement. 
I L can be argued that redeemable shares can be issued hi thou t 
constitutional authorisation . There is a tension in t h e Act between 
section 68 and secLions 36(2) and 42 . The latter two suggest that 
shares can be issued as redeemable simpl) on their terms , without 
60 
the need for provision in the constitution . 
Polic) also suggests that constitutional authorisation is not 
needed. Other transactions such as the purchase of own shares can 
be implemented without constitutional authority, It would be 
strange if redeemable shares were different. 
These questions aside, only around one half of the constitutions 
made provision for the issue of redeemable shares. Many of these 
replicated the tensions in the Act on the matter , a product of the 
drafting style of copying large segments of the Act into 
c o11stitutions , a topic that is dis c ussed in greater detail in Part 
VIII. While it is debitable whether constitutional authorisation is 
needed to issue redeemable shares, they are a useful de v ice , a nd to 
p rov ide for them in the constitution would b e a wise precautionary 
s tep. 
3 Indemn ity and ins uran ce 
If a company wishes to indemnify or insure its directors or 
employees, it must have constitutional authorisation , 139 All of the 
constitutions gave this authorisation. 
The need for such a provision in a one person company is 
debatable, l4C For a company with several persons, it will usually 
be desirable, especially given the heightened anx ieties over the 
directors ' duties contained in the nei-. Act . 141 
14 0 
14 1 
Section 162. 
Compare Dugan above n 98 with Abernethy above n 104. 
Above n 34. 
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E Adoption of Supplementary Provisions 
1 Pre-emptive rights upon transfer of shares 
The Table A articles of the old Act contained pre-emptive rights on 
the transfer of shares . These required that shares first be offered 
to the other shareholders before they were transferred . This is 
consistent with the interests of the members of closel~' held 
companies. 142 
The majority of the constitutions supplemented the Act with such 
provisions. However, it was again surprising to find a large number 
of one person companies containing a provision which is unnecessary 
for them. 
A feature of the pre-emptive rights contained in the constitutions 
was how onerously some of the transfer provisions treated the 
intending transferor. In one case , if after an independent 
valuation of the s hares, the transferor refused to sell at that 
value, they had to pay for the ,aluation, and also to the company 
"a reasonable amount as determined by the directors, ha,ing regard 
to the time spent by them and any other officer of the compan} 
relying on the transfer notice, and any out of pocket expenses 
incurred by the company". This is hardly in the interests of the 
members of a c losel y held company, and does nothing to facilitate 
an easy exit from the company . Such a provision .is ripe for abuse 
during a dispute, the ,ery time that a member will want to lea,e 
the company. 
l 4 2 Radich above n 89, 49. 
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2 Call s o n unpaid shares 
A further provision of the old Table A articles not carried forward 
into the new Act is the procedure for making calls on unpaid 
shares. Section 97(2) specifies the types of liability that may be 
associated with holding shares in a company, including the 
liability for unpaid calls. However, the Acl is silent on how and 
when calls may be made . In a closely held company where shares are 
often issued either partly paid or unpaid, the subsequent payment 
will be a concern , especially for the members who have paid fully. 
The problem can either be addressed in the terms of issue, or in 
general constitutional proYisions . IC 
Nearl y all of the constitutions made provision for lhe making of 
calls, t pically in a manner identica l to the old Table A 
pro~isions . Again there was a high incidence of one person 
companies including this prov ision, which has no application to 
their situation . 
3 Lien s and forfe it ure 
To enforce calls made on unpaid shares, the old Table A arti c les 
also included provisions on liens over and forfeitu r e of shares 
with unpaid calls , 
~ost of the constitutions contained these supplementary prov ision s . 
However , from this a common problem arose. Several of the 
c onstitutions in adding these enforcement procedures from the old 
Act failed to recognise the new liabilit regime under the new Ac t . 
In particular , se eral constitutions prov ided that liability for 
unpaid calls followed the shares through transfers to third 
parties , and attached to t h e nei holder . This is incons i stent with 
143 Radich above n 89 , 34. 
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the Act. Section 97(2) distinguishes between two types of 
liabilits: liability in respect of amounts unpaid on shares, and 
liability imposed by the constitution. Under section 100( 1) the 
former, liability for amounts unpaid on shares, remains with the 
transferor upon the transfer of shares. The provisions in the 
constitutions which purported to transfer the liability to the 
transferee are clearly inconsistent with this. Applying section 
31(1) they would have no effect. 144 
4 Alternate and managing directors 
Again following the old Table A articles, many of the constitutions 
allowed for the appointment of alternate and managing directors. 
Such provisions obvious!} have utility in a closely held company 
situation should the need arise. 
5 Dispute resolution 
In a closely held company the members will often have competing 
. 4' interests, which can lead to a potential deadlock position. 1 ' The 
Act is silent on how these disputes should be resolved. 
Around a third of the constitutions supplemented the Act with 
pro isions for the resolution of disputes, typical!} through 
arbitration. This is a useful provision for the constitution of a 
closely held company, and one that more should utilise. There is 
ob,lous utilit in having the methods for resol,ing disputes set 
out in advance, as they could easily provide fertile ground for 
further disputes if the} are left to be resolved at the time. 
14 4 
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6 Polls and proxies 
The First Schedule to the Act is silent on the method for 
conducting polls, and the form of proxies for shareholder meetings. 
Most of the constitutions supplemented the Act with provisions 
similar to those contained in the old Table A articles. 
7 Like documents for resolutions in lieu 
lost of the constitutions allowed resolutions in lieu of meetings 
under section 122 to consist of several like documents. Resolutions 
in lieu are a useful tool for closel held companies to avoid the 
formalities and procedures of meetings. The ability of the members 
to pass such resolutions while the are in different places adds to 
thi s utility. 146 
F Summary 
The most popular alterations and additions to the statutory 
framework contained in the constitutions included restricting the 
transferability of shares by pro ' iding for pre-emptive rights, 
changing the proceedings for shareholder and board meetings, 
providing for calls on unpaid shares, and the authorisation of 
purchases of own shares, and indemnification and insurance. While 
these all have utility for closely held companies, the 
constitutions studied were inappropriate for such companies because 
of the changes that they failed to make to the statutory regime. 
The constitutions failed to recognise the lack of separation of 
ownership and control in closely held companies , by not displacing 
the presumption of director management. Similar! , there was a 
failure to alter the statutory regime to protect the interests of 
146 Radich above n 89, 41. 
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members of closely held companies, predominantly in terms of the 
regime for shareholder resolutions , and the appointment and removal 
of directors . Left unaltered, the statutory regime will not give 
all the members a say in the running of the business, and will not 
provide security of tenure in office or employment . 14 ? 
This failure can be attributed to the high incidence of standard 
form constitutions. By their very nature , standard form 
constitutions do not meet the needs of particular closely held 
companies. They are drafted in a wide presumptive way, much like 
the Act itself, to cover the wide deviance among closely held 
companies. They do not alter the statutory regime to meet the needs 
of particular companies. The) are therefore inappropriate for man) 
closely held companies, and will not adequately protecl lhe 
interests of their members. 
1 One person companies 
A recurring feature of the study was the inappropriateness of the 
constitutions being employed by one person companies. TJ picall) 
these were constitutions designed for companies with several 
members . Such a constitution adds nothing to a one person compan5 
situation, except confusion. As stated, a one person compan~ can 
operate satisfactorily under the statutory framework without a 
constitution. None of the constitutions improved the regulatory 
framework for one person companies. 
While a constitution may be ~alid as a safeguard for expansion in 
the future, it is not necessary while the company remains in the 
hands of one person. A constitution can be adopted at a later date 
if expansion occurs . 148 This is actually the better time to adopt 
14 7 
14 8 
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one, as the particular control configurations and interests of each 
member that need to be provided for in the constitution will not be 
known before that point in time. 
VIII CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING STYLES 
Distinct from the appropriateness of the contents of the 
constitutions studied, is the question of whether the drafting 
s tyles adopted are suitable for closely held companies. The members 
of such companies are t ypically legall unsophisticated. Therefore 
a c onstitution should as far as possible be a simple and user 
friendly document. 
The c onstitutions studied fell into two distinct drafting 
categories. First, long form constitutions, which contained many of 
the provisions of the Act even if unaltered. 
Secondly, short form constitutions, which took a minimalist 
approach of including only provisions which altered the statutory 
regime in some way. 
A Long Form Constitutions 
The study revealed a roughly even split between long and short form 
constitutions. The single most popular standard form constitution, 
constitution A, was an extremely long form one, running to over 30 
pages of very small print. Constitutions Band D were also long 
form ones. The long form constitutions were employed by both one 
and multi-person companies. 
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The argument in favour of long form constitutions is that they 
provide a complete working document for the members of a closel 
held company , who are usua l l unfamiliar with the provisions of the 
Act . They remove the need to have reference to the Act as ~ell as 
t h e constitution . 149 
It is submitted that this approach is flawed . First, a constitution 
can never be totally comprehensive. Unless it copies all 400 
sections and associated schedules of the Act , there ~ill always be 
some circumstances when reference to the Act itself is necessar~. 
The question then becomes what provisions of the Act should be 
selective l y copied . This leads to a dangerous situation where a 
member may not realise that there are further relevant provisions 
in the Act that are not contained in the constltution , 
By way of example, all of the long form constitutions considered in 
the study copied the provisions of the Act pertaining to the 
purchase of own shares , and the giving of financial assistance. 1~ 
Al l consistently omitted the parts of these provisions which stale 
the rules for the application of the solvenc test, require 
directors ' certification , and state the liability associated ~ith 
these transactions . 
Constitution D copied section 83 pertaining to statements of 
s hareholder rig h ts . However , the details of the contents required 
to be given in such a statement , and the assoc i ated liabilit) for 
failing to provide these details were mlssing . 
Constitution B copied section 162 authorising indemnification and 
insurance , but omitted the section 162(6) duty to certify, and the 
section 162 ( 7) duty to enter the transaction in the interests 
149 
150 
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register. 
Finally , Constitution D repeated section 107 pertaining to 
unanimous assents , but failed to include the section 107(5) 
distinction between specific and general assents , the section 
107(6) right of withdrawal, the section 107(7) notice requirement, 
and the application of the solvency test as provided for in section 
108. 
For consti tut.ions which purport to be comprehensive "one stop" 
points of reference these are serious omissions , which could have 
serious consequences for companies operating under them if the 
members neglect these provisions. 
Secondly , in an event the cross referencing approach of the long 
form constitutions made it necessarJ to refer backwards and 
forwards between the constitution and the Act . This was an exercise 
that often resulted in incomprehensibility and confusion . 
An example of this is constitution A , which copied the provisions 
on financial assistance contained in sections 76 to 81 of the Act. 
These sections contain numerous cross references . The constitution 
took the inconsistent approach of in some instances replacing these 
with cross references to the clauses of the constitution that 
copied the relevant provisions of the Act, and in others using 
cross references back to the Act . 
The drafting style of coping provisions straight from the Act also 
often led to mistakes and inconsistencies , Constitution A in 
copying the provisions for purchase of own shares substituted the 
word "hold " for the word " acquire" as used in the Act, Arguably 
this means that companies operating under this constitution do not 
have the necessary authorisation to " otherwise acquire" their own 
shares. 
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Constitution D copied the section 107 unanimous assent provision, 
but substituted the word "shareholders" for "entitled persons". 
This is a serious mistake. Entitled persons is deliberately wider 
than shareholders, and can include persons outside of the 
company. 151 If the members do not acquire the consent of an outside 
party for a section 107 agreement, because they are under the 
mistaken belief that only the shareholders need consent, the 
1 r ? 
agreement and the associated transaction are arguably invalid. "" 
Constitution D, also through its drafting style, makes the 
application of the solvency test upon section 107 agreements more 
stringent than the Act. Under section 108, only transactions 
assented to under section 107(1) are subject to the solvency test. 
This excludes share issues and self interested transactions ~hich 
are contained in sections 107(2) and 107(3). However, the 
constitution listed all the transactions that could be authorised 
through a unanimous assent, including share issues and self 
interested transactions, and stated that they are all subject to 
the solvency test. 
Changes and omissions in punctuation and words from the original 
text of the Act were also noticeable in many of the long form 
constitutions . While this may seem trivial, the effect c an 
sometimes be significant. For example section 84 requires the board 
to register share transfers unless three criteria are met. The 
inclusion of the word "and" between each of them makes it clear 
that all three must be satisfied. One constitution copied section 
84, but omitted the word "and" from between each of the three 
requirements. This gi es the misguided impression that only one of 
the three need be satisfied. 
151 Section 2, clefini tion of "entitled person". 
11') " - Abo,e n 1, 113. 
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Another constitution repeated the t pes of directors' remuneration 
and benefits that may be authorised under section 161 . However , the 
constitution inadvertently changed " the giving of guarantees by the 
company for debts incurred by a director'' in subsection (l)(d) to 
the totally opposite situation of "guarantee any loan given by a 
director ". Arguab l y companies operating under this constitution 
cannot guarantee indebtedness incurred by a director because that 
power is not authorised in the constitution . 
The irony is that the intended legal effect could be achieved by 
not saying anything in the constitution , as section 161 is 
presumptive, and applies unless restricted in the constitution . 
This is true for the majority of the provisions contained in the 
long form constitutions . They have no legal significance , and 
merely restate the Act without modification . The overall legal 
significance is no different from a short form constitution that 
contains only alterations to the statutory regime. 153 
For those provisions which do have legal effect , such as the 
adoption of optional pro isions like the purchase of own shares , 
the intended legal ef f ect could be achieved with a simple 
authorising sentence , rather than copying the provision in full. 
This also reduces the room for error . 154 
Several of the long form constitutions contained lengthy 
definitional sections . Again these added to the general confusion 
by way of their inconsistency, Typically they defined words not in 
the Act , but then went on to define words already defined in the 
Act . The latter was often done in an inconsistent manner , with a 
mixture of copying the definition contained in the Act , and 
153 
154 
Above n 1 , 146. 
Abo'1e n 1, 140 . 
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referring the user to section 2 of the Act. One constitution 
changed several definitions given in the Act, including that for a 
major transaction. It then went on in a to state that "where there 
is a conflict between a word or expression defined or explained in 
the Act and a word or expression defined or explained in this 
constitution, the constitution shall prevail". Presumably the 
drafter had not been referred to section 31 of the Act . 
B Short Form Constitutions 
Around one half of the constitutions sampled were in the short form 
category. Constitution C was the most popular standard short form 
constitution. It is the product of a large firm of chartered 
accountants, and was found to be predominantly used by one person 
companies (see Table 1) . It takes a minimalist approach , including 
only provisions that have legal significance by altering the 
statutory regime, and not repeating unaltered provisions from the 
Act. 
The short form approach is the preferable approach for drafting 
constitutions for closely held companies . While the legal 
significance of long and short form constitutions is the same , the 
short form constitutions avoid the length , complexity and confusion 
that comes with the long form of repeating unaltered provisions of 
the Act . For most lay people who are the members of closely held 
companies, the long form constitutions would not be understandable. 
The minimalist short form approach avoids this confusion. It 
recognises that no matter how comprehensi"e a constitution is, 
reference to the Act will still be required. The Act is the primary 
instrument for the regulation of the company structure , and as such 
has to be consulted. Short form constitutions also avoid t h e risk 
of inconsistencies and errors that come with the long form 
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approach . 155 
IX CONCLUSIONS 
The nature of closely held companies means that they sit uneasily 
within the traditional company law regulatory framework , which is 
predominantly designed for more widely held companies . The Law 
Commission recognised this in drafting the Companies Act 1993 , and 
provided the ability for closely held companies to obviate and vary 
the statutor regime to meet their needs . 
Section 107 allows closely held companies to avoid many of the 
unnecessar regulatory provisions of the Act . However, its ability 
to be effective is reduced by the inclusion of certain features not 
found in North American shareholder agreements , upon which it is 
based. These include the extended approval requirement, the 
termination right , and the uncertainty of its scope. In particular , 
its impact on the common law doctrine of unanimous shareholder 
assent is far from clear. 
The constitution provides the means for a closely held company to 
vary the otherwise inappropriate provisions of the Act . However , 
the results of this study have revealed that to date it is being 
used with limited effect . 
A Inci d e n ce of Constitutions 
Most closely held companies are 
includes one person companies , 
15f Radich above n 18 , 19 . 
registering 
for who m 
constitutions . 
the merits 
This 
of a 
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constitution are debatable. The 
provisions that greatly improved 
person companies. 
study found no 
the statutory 
B Standard Form v Tailor-Made Constitutions 
constitutional 
regime for one 
Standard form constitutions are 
registration of constitutions that 
closely held company situations. 
prevalent, leading to 
are inappropriate for 
the 
many 
C Modifications to Presumptive Provisions 
The most popular changes to the presumptive provisions of the Act 
were to restrict the free transferability of shares, and change the 
proceedings for shareholder and board meetings. Few constitutions 
altered the statutory control regime or displaced the presumption 
of director management. These changes would be appropriate for 
closely held companies, to provide for and protect the interests of 
members, and to reduce the formalities involved in operating the 
business. 
D Adoption of Optional Provisions 
Almost all of the constitutions adopted the optional provisions of 
the Act. The most popular were the ability to indemnify and insure 
officers, and to purchase own shares. These are useful pro\isions 
for closely held companies to have. 
E Adoption of Supplementary Provisions 
Most of the constitutions contained 
matters on which the Act is silent. 
supplementary provisions on 
These generally followed the 
provisions of the old Table A articles, with pre-emptive rights on 
share transfers and calls on unpaid shares. Again, these are useful 
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pro\isions in a closely held company situation. 
F Drafting Style 
The constitutions were either long or short form documents. The 
short form constitutions were far more appropriate for closely held 
companies . They achieved the same legal significance as the long 
form variety, but with greater brevity, less confusion and 
inconsistencies. 
G Conclusion 
While this study represents only a limited examination of an 
important issue, it is hoped that it has highlighted some 
concerning trends for many of New Zealand's small businesses. So 
far it appears as if they are still coming to terms with the Act, 
and its applicability to closely held companies. 
The constitution represents an opportunity for a compan to devise 
a regulatory document that meets its particular needs. To date few 
appear to ha e done this . Instead they are operating either under 
the Act or a standard form constitution, both of which are usually 
inappropriate for them. 
Until there is a recognition of both the unique features of the 
closely held company, and the need for tailor-made constitutions to 
suit particular company situations, the saturation of 
unsatisfactor standard form constitutions seems set to continue . 
It is acknowledged that cost and convenience makes a standard form 
constitution more ,iable for such small companies . The expense and 
time in seeking legal and business advice to have a tailor-made 
constitution drawn up will often be prohibitive to these types of 
businesses . However , when one considers just how inappropriate the 
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standard form constitutions are, and the problems that could flow 
from them, the cost of a tailor-made constitution would be money 
well spent to protect the interests and investment of the members. 
It is not easy to see how the trend can be reversed. The short term 
attractions of standard form constitutions will always make them 
popular, and ensure that they are available. However , advisors to 
closely held companies need to ensure that the members take a long 
term view, and adopt a constitution that protects their interests, 
rather than just being cheap and convenient. 
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